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FROM THE FORUM 
The National Security Presidency in 
Constitutional Context: 
REFLECTIONS ON TERRORISM AND THE PRESIDENCY 
FROM THE LAST TEN YEARS 
BY JAMES E. BAKER 
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I n this time of terrorist threat, there is no more important institution to study than the national security presidency. That is because the president is singular-
ly situated to command the instruments to counter terrorbm. He is also singular-
ly situated to ensure that such instruments are used effectively, lawfully, and in a 
manner consistent with constitutional values. I believe I have a duty, based on 
where I have been, to help others observe and understand the institution of the 
presidency. I do so became I want the national security presidency to ~ucceed in 
providing for our physical security and in upholding our constitutional way of life; 
or, as the president's constitutional oath states succinctly, "to preserve, protect. 
and defend the Constitution." Those who teach, interpret and study the presi-
dency have an important duty to play in this process by testing the institution to 
ensure that these functions are successfully performed. 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT AND PRACTICE 
I once had occasion in a public setting while standing be~idc the national securi-
ty adviser to describe my bos~. When I launched into a description of the 
Constitution and Articles I. II. and HI, there wa~ a gasp in the room as it became 
apparent that I was not talking about the man at my side. An emerging smile on 
Mr. Berger's face put the audience at ease. Mr. Berger understood that our oaths 
of service are to the Constitution, and not to the presidem, or any other person. 
The presidency is a creation of the Constitution. Ib responsibilities arc defined 
by the Constitution. Therefore, it must be evaluated with the Constitution in 
mind. So let me start with four observations regarding the Constitution in presi-
dential practice. 
First, the Constitution is opportunity and not result. The United States 
Constitution is history's greatest code of governmental honor. Part of its greatness 
derives from its success in providing for collective physical security at the same 
time that it provides a framework for lives of individual choice and opportunity. 
From a military perspective, the Comtitution establishes the principle of civilian 
control of the military and provides for separate and shared authorities over the 
resort to war and the means of war. The immediate and intended advantages of 
such a structure for a democracy are 
obvious. Less apparent are the indirect 
benefit~ resulting from a military 
devoted to its profession rather than to 
its politic~. and from a military that is 
derivative of the people, and not 
beholden to a particular branch of gov-
ernment. person, or party. 
At the same time, the Constitution 
acknowledges that individuals and 
governments do not always act with 
em it is on the integrity and values of 
those who wield its power. Rule of law 
is a daily commitment to the process of 
constitutional government, and to 
one's individual role and duty in that 
process. This is particularly true in a 
secret war against terrorists where the 
ordinary mechanisms of validation and 
appraisal exercised by the press, the 
public, the Congress, and the judiciary, 
may be muted, deferential, or even 
honor. "If men were angels, no govern- absent. 
ment would be necessary. "1 Madison 
wrote, and "if angels were to govern 
men. neither external nor internal con-
trob on government would be neces-
sary." I marvel at the drafters' ability to 
foresee so many of the ways that men 
and women within each branch might 
undermine the intent and spirit of the 
Constitution, driven by the real. and 
perceived. necessities of the moment. 
Therefore, at almost every metaphori-
cal crossroads there is a structural "con-
trol" in the Constitution to remind us 
of our democratic and legal roots. And 
when government has strayed from 
the constitutional path. we have also 
learned that the Comtitution has a 
heavy keel. which is capable of righting 
the ship of state. But it is the helmsman 
and the crew and not the ship that 
seizes the wind of constitutional oppor-
tunity. 
That leads me to my second obser-
vation. The Comtitution is not on 
autopilot. Like everyone else. I learned 
about the checks and balances in high 
schooL college. and law school. 
Invariably. these controls were present-
ed with operational certitude. The 
In national security, there is always 
an argument. and often a good argu-
ment. for truncating process. classify-
ing decisions, and asserting broad 
authority so as not to unduly delimit 
responses to unknown and perilous 
contexts. As illustration. the National 
Security Act envisions three congres-
sional reporting mechanisms for covert 
action: 1) prior notification of the full 
committees; 2) prior notification of 
eight leaders in "extraordinary circum-
stances;" and 3) post-facto notification, 
in undefined circumstances that, pre-
sumably, are more than "extraordi-
nary."2 In the long run. there are 
enduring consequences if we make the 
"extraordinary circumstance" the 
norm. And yet, we live in extraordi-
nary times. Part of the president's 
duty then. and that of his lawyers. is 
to make decisions on a factual and 
constitutional continuum and to iden-
tify the short term and long term sub-
stantive and procedural consequences 
of decision. 
Third. the Constitution functions as 
much through informal application as 
it does through formal checks and bal-
practice of constitutional law at the ances. Constitutional government is a 
NSC taught me otherwise. I was sur- daily grind of contacts and disclosure. 
prised at how fragile constitutional none of which would happen without 
government can be and how depend- the constant effort of a few persons 
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with the vision and commitment to 
meaningfully apply the process and 
substance of law. This means that 
much of the process of notification. 
consultation, and validation between 
political branches goes unseen. But the 
daily give and take between the politi-
cal branches is oil between the gears of 
constitutional government. Those who 
focus on form alone will see only a 
Kosovo War Power~ report of careful 
design and limited content and not the 
48 informal congressional briefs that 
preceded the report. Those who focus 
on function alone will note only 
whether the president notified the con-
gressional leadership before a terrorist 
strike. but not whether it was done 
with a receptive ear. 
All of these observations lead to a 
fourth fundamental observation. The 
concept of law depends on individual 
conduct and vision. It depends on a 
president and a process of presidential 
decision that incorporate the meaning-
ful application of law. For even where 
the legal standard is clear. someone 
must still identify and trigger the stan-
dard. As A. Whitney Griswold 
observed, while we are a nation of 
laws. it is men and women who write, 
interpret, and apply the law, which 
means "we have in fact a government 
of laws and a government of men." ' 
The Constitution may have given us a 
framework for civilian control over the 
military. but it was George Washington 
five years earlier surrendering his com-
mission to the Congress. that put this 
principle into practice. 
Today. and for years to come. no 
person will have more influence on 
whether and how we turn constitu-
tional principle into practice than the 
president. 
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Presidwt George W Bush, Vice Presidmt Riclwrd Che11ey, Do11ald Rumsfeld, 
a11d Colldoleezza Rice. at the Pe11tago11, September 12. 200 I. 
THE NATIONAL SECURITY 
PRESIDENCY 
During the past ten years the presidency 
moved from the episodic crisis and 
response to terrorism. to a constant state 
of readiness and perpetual command 
over the policy instruments to counter 
terrorism. While there may be more 
than one reasonable view a~ to when 
this process started. without question it 
was underway after the first World 
Trade Center attack in I993. After the 
August 1998 embassy bombings. count-
er-terrorism command became the 
daily. centraL omnipresent feature of the 
national ~ecurity presidency. September 
II in turn ensured that counter terror-
ism would become a permanent fixture 
of the institution of the presidency. in 
the same way that atomic weapons per-
manently transformed the presidency 
after World War II. 
To be sure. terrorism was among 
the government's highest priorities 
throughout the 1990s and well before. 
I certainly felt that way in the early 
1990s when I had the counterterrorism 
account in the State Department's 
Legal Office. I was not alone in this 
outlook. There was always a profes-
sional cadre of officials addressing the 
terrorist threat, and they could always 
and immediately call on the attention 
of the principal national security offi-
cials. Serious efforts at weapons of 
mass destruction defense. for example, 
began in the mid-I990s after the Tokyo 
subway attack. Moreover, the full 
range of instrument~ for responding to 
terrorism was alway~ on the policy 
table. 
But in retrospect. I think the influ-
ence of terrorism on the presidency 
itself was at first evolutionary. After 
August 1998, the effect was more rev-
olutionary as it was clear the United 
States was facing an organized world-
wide terrorism network capable of 
attacking hardened targets and with an 
avowed intent to kill as many 
Americans as possible and to do so with 
weapons of mass destruction. 
., I ..,~ .. , • • .,. '· • ' 
In 1990, terrorism was one of a 
number of important national security 
issues. In 1998, terrorism became the 
business of the day, every day, not one 
of a number of revolving crises. This 
decision, I mean express approvaL such 
as a memorandum box checked or 
direct verbal assent. I also mean less 
formal approval such as the verbal 
assent at the close of a brief, or 
was true for the president. It was true acknowledgment of an information 
for the national security adviser. And, it 
was also true for their national security 
lawyer. Every day I came to work and, 
indeed, every time the phone rang at 
home-the attorney general on a 
Sunday afternoon, the national securi-
ty adviser at 3:00 a.m. on almost any 
night-! anticipated that the issue was 
terrorbm and that decision-makers 
were addressing an emerging target or 
potential threat. This required an 
understanding of how the president 
makes decisions so that I could provide 
legal guidance in an effective and time-
ly manner. 
National security does not wait for 
lawyers. In such a context, if a lawyer's 
advice is not immediate, or if a lawyer 
is not able to guide to yes, or il neces-
sary say no, then he will not be con-
sulted. 
PRESIDENTIAL PROCESS 
AND DECISION 
The president has traditionally used 
two structural resources to manage 
national security: cabinet government 
and the NSC proce~~. Tensions can arise 
between the two, with Iran-Contra as a 
recent example. But I do not view 
these structures as inherently in con-
flict. Rather, when exercised with 
appropriate oversight, they are compli-
mentary mechanisms of decision, and 
only in rare cases where the president 
is directly engaged, implementation. 
By president, I mean the actual 
holder of that office, not the NSC staff 
who advise and assist him. And by 
memorandum read before action is 
taken. 
In the past ten years, the critical 
presidential decisions on terrorism 
were framed and decided by the presi-
dent using the NSC process. 
Specifically, this process centered on an 
NSC-Ied working group, the 
Com1terterrorism Security Group 
(CSG), reporting directly to the 
Principals Committee, or a small group 
of principals and the president. 
The threat from terrorism is real. It 
is imminent. It is lasting. It is potential-
ly devastating. And, it is local. Whether 
by design or default, the pre~ident b 
singularly situated to respond. The 
president alone has the decisional 
capacity and authority to do so in a 
timely and effective manner. The pres-
ident is also best situated to appraise 
the efficacy and lawfulness of U.S. 
actions. 
Let me demonstrate what I mean. 
The president is the most effective 
engine in government. He commands 
response. If he holds a meeting, people 
come. Presidential decision-making can 
be extraordinarily fast. I have partici-
pated in the most difficult question of 
law and fact that was identified, 
briefed, and decided by the president, 
with the concurrence of the attorney 
generaL in less than five minutes. 
Speaking with reference to leadership 
targets in Iraq, General Franks 
acknowledged that presidential deci-
sions can be made on "an amazing time 
line[.]"' Based on my seven years at the 
Constitutional government is a 
daily grind of contacts and 
disclosure, none of which 
would happen without the 
constant effort of a few 
persons with the vision and 
commitment to meaningfully 
apply the process and 
substance of law. This means 
that much of the process of 
notification, consultation, and 
validation between political 
branches goes unseen. But the 
daily give and take between 
the political branches is oil 
between the gears of 
constitutional government. 
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NSC, I am persuaded that if you give 
me a problem and a timeline, I can pro-
vide you with a process of decision, and 
if appropriate consultation, that will 
contextually and effectively include the 
application of policy and law by offi-
cials who are constitutionally account-
able for their advice and their 
decisions. 
The president can also gather and 
fuse multiple sources of information 
and perspective faster than any other 
official in government, which is essen-
tial when pop-up targets emerge for 
moments and strike decisions must be 
taken in difficult geopolitical contexts 
with imperfect information. Presiden-
tial fusion is also important where a 
target presents difficult factuaL or intel-
ligence judgments like an Al-Shifa. In 
these latter cases, additional perspec-
tive may distinguish the sound decision 
from the merely rapid decision. 
Presidential process, in my view, 
also generally contributes to better 
decision. First, as a bureaucratic obser-
vation, staff work tends to improve in 
rigor as it runs up the chain of com-
mand, particularly to the president. 
Second, presidential process can serve 
as a fail-safe where such process chan-
nels options into regular and special-
ized review. Significantly, the 
erroneous bombing of the Chinese 
Embassy in Belgrade during the 
Kosovo campaign followed the identifi-
cation and generation of a target out-
side the normal target process. While 
the presumptive target designated in 
briefs was indeed military in nature, as 
is now well-known, human error 
placed the target at the wrong coordi-
nates, even as the correct target was 
reviewed and approved by the chain of 
command. 
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Presidmt Bush with Do1wld Rwnsfeld. 
The president is also singularly situ-
ated to address is~ues of interagency 
policy dispute. There is nothing wrong 
with such disputes. They help to identi-
fy issues and best options. They are 
problematic if they linger or if they drive 
principals' decisions down to lowest 
common consensus rather than leave 
hard questions up to the president. 
In addition to resolving policy db-
putes, the president alone may have 
the will and the power to force deci-
sions to the surface. Master bureaucrats 
know how to stop policy initiatives in 
their tracks through grudging staff 
work or tl~e assertion of departmental 
authority. The CIA can invoke "sources 
and methods" to prevent the disclosure 
of information another agency might 
wish to disclose to win allied support or 
defend a decision. The Defense 
Department can argue that a proposed 
mission is outside its national security 
mandate. And, the State Department 
can and will almost always plead lack 
of funding. 
Where persuasion fails, the presi-
dent alone has the authority to compeL 
through exercise of his constitutional 
authority over state secrets; through 
determination as commander in chief 
that the proposed assistance is a 
national security mission; and, by 
directing the draw-down of govern-
ment stocks and surpluses. These illus-
trations demonstrate the essential role 
that law plays in the national security 
presidency. 
As significantly, the president can 
call upon "the bully pulpit" to effect 
counter-terrorism policy. "National 
security" reaches a vein of American 
patriotism, commitment. and sacrifice 
that is not tapped through other 
means; and no one can reach this vein 
like the president. As Alexander 
Hamilton recognized in Federalist 8: 
"Safety from external danger is the 
most powerful director of national con-
duct."' When it comes to homeland 
security, the potential importance of 
this function is magnified. 
First, the socialization of danger 
after 9/ II has made ordinary citizens 
participants in the national security 
process in a way not previously experi-
enced. At the ~ame time, as I think 
Secretary Ridge ha~ recognized, the 
public may become hardened to per-
petual alarm and in the future may 
hesitate to take essential actions unless 
asked by the president to do ~o. The 
president alone, for example, may be 
able to convince populations outside 
New York and Washington that the 
threat from terrorism is as real and 
imminent for them as it is for those 
cities. 
Second, homeland security has 
placed state and local authorities on the 
front lines of national security. Today, 
vertical process is as important as 
national process. This is new national 
security ground, where the president's 
power to persuade is essential if tradi-
tional principles of federalism are to 
remain intact. Alternatively, in the 
absence of preemptive legi~lation, the 
exercise of presidential constitutional 
authority may be necessary to enforce 
quarantines or respond to interstate 
events. 
Finally, while the government has 
so far prescribed only a limited role for 
the military in homeland security, 
there is no question in my mind that 
the military alone has the capacity and 
expertise to deal with some of the cat-
astrophic contingencies in play. The 
Northern Command is the military's 
surge potential. Such a use of the mili-
tary may transform America's percep-
tion of the military. The president alone 
can order such action, and it would 
seem, that he alone could persuade the 
public that such action was both neces-
sary and temporary. 
As these homeland security exam-
ples illustrate, the president is singular-
ly situated to direct the war on 
terrorbm because he alone wields the 
constitutional and statutory authority 
to do so. The president's core counter-
terrorism tools are military force, and 
intelligence, economic, and foreign 
affairs instruments. 
Military force. Clearly, the presi-
dent should decide that which he is 
constitutionally required to decide-
truism. This includes the resort to 
force. Successive administrations have 
cited, in war powers reports, the presi-
dent's authority as commander in 
chief, his control over foreign affairs, 
and his role as chief executive, as 
authority tor a president's use of force. 
In the context of terrorism and home-
land security, the president's duty "to 
take care that the laws be faithfully 
executed" is also implicated.'· 
Whether the president must abo 
approve the methods and means of 
force will depend on the context. This 
might be the ca~e when a targeting 
decision itself constitutes the constitu-
tional authorization to resort to force; 
for example, the 1986 aerial raid on 
Tripoli, or the 1998 combined strikes 
on a terrorist command meeting in 
Afghanistan and the Al-Shifa pharma-
ceutical plant in Sudan. In addition, the 
pre~ident alone may have the authori-
ty to change a concept of operations or 
timeline he has previously approved, 
or to approve certain types of targets or 
the use of certain weapons. It is also 
clear that the president is specially situ-
ated to make the legal and policy judg-
ments associated with the law of armed 
conflict. He and the Secretary of 
Defense are the only civiliam within 
the military chain of command, and he 
alone has the constitutional authority 
and duty to command U.S. forces and 
to uphold the law. 
Intelligence. Intelligence is the 
oxygen of counter-terrorism. As is well 
understood now, but has always been 
the case, the national intelligence 
capacity is diffuse and the responsibility 
over its priorities and functions at times 
is uncertain. Certainly, the Department 
of Defense and the CIA comprise the 
central components of national intelli-
gence. But the National Security Act 
accepts a bifurcation in responsibility 
over the day-to-day intelligence func-
tions between the secretary of defense 
and the director of central intelligence, 
the exact split of which is not always 
certain. Moreover while the majority of 
intelligence assets, measured in terms 
of production, personnel and cost, 
reside within the Department of 
Defense, the majority of domestic intel-
ligence capabilities are regulated by the 
Department of Justice and /or 
Department of Homeland Security. At 
the same time, Executive order 12333 
recognized 14 components to the 
"intelligence community." ' In fact. 
there are more, if one considers that the 
Center~ for Disease ControL USDA, or 
the local sheriff also may be critical con-
duits of actionable information. 
Understanding this breadth, the 
coordination challenge is clear. Even if 
agencies consisted entirely of angels, 
they might differ on the best means to 
accomplish common goals. In reality, 
the only official with the necessary 
legal and policy authority to centrally 
control the entirety of America's 
national intelligence function is the 
president. Thus, the question is not 
whether the secretary of defense, the 
DCL or the secretary of homeland 
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... all presidents deeply and 
sincerely feel a duty to 
protect American lives. I 
found this pressure palpable 
when observing the 
president I worked for and I 
think it is evident in the 
language and actions of 
President Bush and 
presidents before him. But it 
must be exercised in 
coordination with his duty to 
uphold the Constitution. 
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security should direct and control a 
central intelligence function, but how 
these officials might best advise and 
assist the president in fulfilling his con-
stitutional responsibilities over intelli-
gence, found in Article II, recognized in 
executive practice, identified in those 
few Supreme Court decisions that 
address intelligence, such as Tottend 
(1875), Curtiss-Wright,'' and Egan, '" and 
legislated in the National Security Act. 
Presidential Reporting. The pres-
ident is also responsible for a large vol-
ume of annual and episodic reports to 
Congress. The breadth of the presi-
dent's reporting requirements is 
incredible, and probably not apparent 
to all but those few persons who 
review (or sign) every report. There are 
too many reports for sure, and this b 
an area where presidential process 
should be streamlined. But I should 
Administrations that do not fully grasp note as well that some reports might 
the president's central intelligence role have useful and unanticipated function 
will increase the risk of another 9 Ill. in the terrorism context. Let me give 
With respect to covert action, the you one example. 
president'~ role is defined and certain. The War Powers Resolution 
Resort to covert action requires the requires the president to submit a 
president to determine that an activity report to the Congress within 48 hours 
"i~ necessary to support identifiable 
foreign policy objectives of the United 
States and is important to the national 
security of the United States ."'' Thus, 
covert action is an instrument of presi-
dential policy. 
Economic and Diplomatic 
Instruments. Similarly, the Interna-
tional Emergency Economic Powers 
Act (IEEPA), which provides authority 
to freeze and seize terrorists' assets and 
prevent transactions with terrorist 
states, requires a presidential declara-
tion of national emergency finding an 
"unusual and extraordinary threat to 
the national security, foreign policy, or 
economy of the United States." 11 Like-
wise, many of the mo~t significant 
exceptions to the Foreign Assistance 
Act, permitting the provision of count-
er terrorism and other assistance 
notwithstanding stattnory limitations 
that might otherwise apply to allies 
cooperating in the war on terrorism, 
are contingent on particularized presi-
dential determinations of national 
security need. " 
after introducing United States armed 
forces into hostilities or into situations 
where hostilities are imminent; into 
the territory, airspace, or waters of a 
foreign nation while equipped for com-
bat; or in numbers that substantially 
enlarge U.S. armed forces equipped for 
combat already located in a foreign 
nation.'• As a matter of longstanding 
practice, the executive branch does not 
indicate under what section a report is 
filed. This reflects the difficulty in 
drawing legal lines between "imminent 
hostilities," "ongoing hostilities," and 
scenarios where forces are "equipped 
for combat," particularly where it is 
hoped that the latter will deter the for-
mer." As importantly, reports involving 
"hostilities" are inextricably linked to 
the 60-day clock, which is, in theory, 
triggered by "hostilities." '" Among 
other things, the resolution requires 
the president to report on the circum-
stances necessitating deployment, the 
legal authority for the deployment and 
the estimated scope and duration of the 
hostilities or involvement. " 
------~~~----------------------------------~----~--~----~ · 
Successive administrations have 
submitted "war powers" reports. 
always preserving as a matter of record 
that the report is submitted "consis-
tent" with the War Powers Resolution. 
but not "pursuant" to it, which in legal 
theory would imply acceptance of its 
constitutionality and binding nature. In 
practice, grudging and pedantic debates 
over whether a soldier was "equipped 
for combat" have given way to a gener-
al executive and bureaucratic accept-
ance that war powers reports are part 
of the national security process, and 
ultimately a useful method of creating 
a paper trail of congressional consulta-
tion for long term deployments. As a 
result, the executive on my watch put 
as much time into preparing the 
reports as they used to put into think-
ing of reasons why a report need not be 
submitted. 
The majority of war power reports 
are inconsequential and ministerial. 
Nonetheless, the reports sometimes 
serve a useftil purpose if executed in 
good faith. The reporting elements 
force the executive branch to consider 
at the outset of a deployment questions 
involving scope and duration, at a time 
when policymakers are almost exclu-
sively focused on the predicate reasons 
for deployment. Further, because the 
report is sent under presidential signa-
ture, and not directly from one depart-
ment or another, the report can serve 
as a useful test of purpose. Do the 
national security agencies agree on the 
characterization of the mission, its 
goals, and its anticipated length? Does 
the president agree with the bureau-
cracy's characterization in the draft 
report? In addition, the report makes 
the president accountable for the exer-
cise of presidential authority. For these 
same reasons the reports are often 
diluted to the lowest common denomi-
nator of agreement. Nonetheless, in 
the process, the executive may find fis-
sures within the bureaucracy that 
while not ultimately reflected in a 
generic report, serve as the touchstone 
for internal consideration. 
In reality, the Congress if not the 
public at large, will be informed of 
most operations in advance, or imme-
diately after, through the process of 
consultation or by the press. However, 
in a war on terrorism, where the presi-
dent has emphasized the necessity of 
engaging in secret and covert opera-
tions, war power reporting may take 
on added importance. The reports may 
serve as a trip wire to ensure notifica-
tion to the Congress of deployments 
that may not warrant individual con-
sultation in the context of an overall 
campaign. 
Appraisal. Harold Lasswell and 
Myres McDougaL in their study of gov-
ernment process identitied seven func-
tional components to decision: 
intelligence, promotion, prescription, 
invocation, application, termination, 
and appraisal. So far, I have identified 
for you reasons why the national secu-
rity president is singularly situated to 
perform the first four of these func-
tions. I would like to conclude by dis-
cussing why the president is also 
singularly situated to perform the 
appraisal function in a war on terror-
ism. I am not expressing a value judg-
ment. My observation is not intended 
to dissuade other branche<> of govern-
ment, the public, the press. and the 
academy, from engaging in the apprais-
al function. Quite the contrary, my goal 
is to help those who study the presi-
dency to determine how they might 
most appropriately and effectively per-
form this function, aware of the factu-
aL prudential, and legal influences that 
may apply. Nonetheless, the reality is 
that the president is specially situated 
to perform the appraisal function. By 
appraisaL I mean the considered appli-
cation of constitutional structure, exec-
utive process, legal substance, and the 
review of decisions both before and 
after they occur. 
AppraisaL I believe, is the least 
understood and defined aspect of the 
national security presidency. And for a 
presidency conditioned to crisis and 
command, it is the most difficult deci-
sional function to implement. 
However, it may be the most important 
function in a war against terrorism. 
Appraisal tells you whether your policy 
is working. The benefit of such review 
is obvious where the margin for error is 
small, resources are finite, the threat is 
WMD, and the enemy is global. So too, 
events are intertwined; each decision 
will bear both intended and unintend-
ed consequences. 
An effective process of appraisaL in 
my view, should also be the sine qua 
non for the broad and flexible grant of 
authority necessary to detect and 
respond to terrorism. However, ordi-
nary mechanisms of appraisal are often 
muted in the national security, and 
particularly the terrorism, context. 
First, counter-terrorism efforts are 
often and necessarily secret; therefore 
the press and the public are not as able 
to perform their ordinary function of 
testing and validating executive action. 
Second, the Congress and the Judiciary 
apply principles of deference to nation-
al security generally, and no more so 
than when lives are at stake. Thus. 
ordinary constitutional processes of 
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democratic and constitutional legit-
imization may be les~ effective. Finally, 
in no area of policy will the pressure to 
"get it right" be strong as within the 
executive branch; in no area should it 
be as strong. 
I am confident that all presidents 
deeply and sincerely feel a duty to pro-
tect American lives. I found this pres-
sure palpable when observing the 
president I worked for and I think it is 
evident in the language and actions of 
President Bush and presidents before 
him. But it must be exercised in coor-
dination with his duty to uphold the 
presidential decisions should provide 
for speedy and flexible response, they 
should also be crafted with suflicient 
specificity so that it is clear to the pres-
ident what he is deciding and the 
implications of doing so, and so it is 
clear to those implementing the deci-
sion what they are authorized to do. 
Operators will almost always push for 
more flexibility. Presidents should be 
careful they do not go too far and sur-
render authority over the actual sub-
stance of a decision. For you cannot 
have effective appraisaL and accounta-
bility, if there is no discernible standard 
Constitution. This means that the pres- against which to mea~ure result. 
ident must ensure that he has a process 
that meaningfully appraises as well as 
decides. In my view, this requires role-
playing; that is, the designation of offi-
cials who have as their responsibility 
ensuring that ongoing operations are 
conducted consistent with Jaw and in a 
manner consistent with presidential 
direction. Do presidential directives 
work in practice? Has presidential 
process delayed decision, or put U.S. 
persons at risk? If so, is such process 
well founded? Do policy or legal direc-
tives, which provide for headquarters 
exception. nonetheless chill agency 
risk-taking as a matter of bureaucratic 
culture? Where the President has pro-
vided limited or nuanced authorization 
have circumstances changed? 
In the case of a campaign conduct-
ed with embedded journalists reporting 
24/7, the answers to these questions 
may be self-evident without need for 
inquiry. But where clandestine opera-
tions are involved, or serial conflicts 
outside the public eye. e.g., the Iraq No 
Fly Zones ( 1991-2003) or Somalia, 
such questions are more relevant. 
I believe this also means that while 
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Moreover, presidential decision is an 
essential source of democratic and con-
stitutional legitimacy for actions taken 
in secret with limited external input or 
review. 
* * * 
Much about presidential decision-
making properly derives from the per-
~onality and style of each president. 
Presidential process will also be shaped 
by the president's views, and those of 
his senior staff. regarding the role of 
the president as commander in chief. It 
will also reflect the level of confidence 
a president has in his subordinates and, 
perhaps, his confidence in his own sub-
stantive and moral command over 
security. However, I believe after 
August 1998, that there are aspects of 
the national security presidency that 
must and will remain constant. 
First, the presidency must continue 
to be defined and evaluated in a consti-
tutional context. The Constitution pro-
vides a framework for opportunity that 
embraces national security and a 
process of lawful and democratic deci-
sion. Second, in light of the imminent 
and potentially catastrophic threat we 
face, the president must daily exercise 
effective command over all the instru-
ments to counter terrorism. As impor-
tantly, the president and his immediate 
staff must recognize that the president 
alone is singularly situated to perform 
this function. Third. the president must 
appraise the manner in which these 
instruments are used to ensure that 
they are employed effectively and law-
fully. 
Finally, with counter-terrorism the 
constitutional buck will indeed always 
stop on the president's desk. + 
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